Pamphlet  No.  48 
Series  1927-28 
January,  1928 


A Constructive  American 
Foreign  Policy 


DISCUSSED  BY 

Walter  Scott  Penfield 
Nicholas  Murray  Butler 


A STENOGRAPHIC  REPORT  OF  THE 

100th  New  York  Luncheon  Discussion 
December  3,  1927 
of  the 

Foreign  Policy  Association 

NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 

Eighteen  East  Forty-First  Street 
New  York  City 


SPEAKERS; 

NICHOLAS  MURRAY  BUTLER 

President,  Columbia  University. 

President,  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace. 

WALTER  SCOTT  PENFIELD 

Formerly  counsel  at  legations  of  Nicaragua,  Salvador,  Venezuela  and 
Dominican  Republic;  Attorney  for  State  Department,  1901-04; 
technical  adviser  for  Panama  at  Paris  Peace  Conference. 


JAMES  G.  McDonald,  chairman 


SPEAKER  S’  TABLE 


Mr.  Ernest  Angell 

Prof.  Philip  Marshall  Brown 

Dr.  Nicholas  Murray  Butler 

Mr.  H.  W.  Dodds 

Mr.  Allen  W.  Dulles 

Mr.  Austen  G.  Fox 

Mr.  John  P.  Gavit 

Mr.  Norman  Hapgood 

Mr.  Howard  Heinz 

Hon.  David  Jayne  Hill 

Dr.  Hamilton  Holt 


Mrs.  Roland  G.  Hopkins 
Prof.  Philip  C.  Jessup 
Mr.  Otto  H.  Kahn 
Mr.  Frederic  R.  Kellogg 
Mr.  Gardner  Lattimer 
Mrs.  Gardner  Lattimer 
Mr.  James  G.  MacDonald 
Mr.  Walter  Scott  Penfield 
Sir  Rennell  Rodd 
The  Comtesse  de  Salignac-Fenelon 
Prof.  James  T.  Shotwell 
Mr.  Walter  West 


A Constructive  American 
Foreign  Policy 


Introductory  Remarks 

JAMES  G.  McDonald,  chairman 

This  is  the  one  hundredth  luncheon  of  the  Foreign  Policy  Associa- 
tion in  New  York.  Like  so  many  of  its  predecessors,  it  is  being 
shared  through  the  courtesy  of  WEAL  with  what  we  like  to  think 
is  a wide  and  discriminating  radio  audience. 

I hope  therefore  that  none  of  you  here  or  none  of  you  who  are 
listening  in  on  this  discussion  much  more  comfortably  at  home  will  per- 
emptorily object  if  I take  three  or  four  minutes  to  outline  the  growth  of 
the  Foreign  Policy  Association,  since  the  first  luncheon  nine  years  ago. 

Then,  we  were  a tiny  New  York  group  of  about  thirty-five.  Now, 
we  are  a national  organization  of  more  than  eight  thousand  members  in 
forty-eight  states  and  eighteen  foreign  countries.  Then,  we  had  a staff 
of  five.  Now,  we  have  a staff  of  thirty-five.  Then,  in  addition  to  occa- 
sional luncheons  in  New  York,  we  sometimes  issued  statements  to  the 
press.  Now,  with  a staff  seven  times  that  size,  we  have  meetings  in 
New  York  and  crowd  the  largest  ballrooms  in  fourteen  or  fifteen  other 
cities.  But,  despite  our  increased  staff,  we  are  more  modest  than  we  used 
to  be.  We  no  longer  feel  capable  of  issuing  pronouncements  on  questions 
of  foreign  policy.  Instead,  we  are  striving  to  function  in  a much  more 
humble,  but,  we  believe,  more  useful  and  more  difficult  way,  that  is,  to 
supply  factual  data  on  problems  of  international  relations  to  those  whose 
daily  job  it  is  to  write  or  speak  about  international  affairs. 

We  do  this  in  the  following  ways : First,  through  our  brief  weekly 
News  Bulletin.  Second,  through  the  fortnightly  Information  Service  re- 
ports of  the  Research  Department.  Each  report  is  what  a layman,  or 
rather  a lawyer,  woul-d  call  an  agreed  statement  of  facts  about  some  one 
important  international  problem.  They  are  designed  and  made  available 
for  those  who  write  and  speak  on  foreign  affairs,  particularly  to  the  seven 
hundred  editors  of  the  daily  press  with  a circulation  of  more  than  ten 
thousand. 

The  State  Department  has  repeatedly  emphasized  its  faith  in  their  fac- 
tual character,  and  within  the  last  two  years  we  have  received  hundreds  of 
enthusiastic  letters  from  editors  and  others  who  tell  us  that  these  re- 
ports are  serving  admirably  the  purpose  for  which  they  are  designed,  that 
is,  to  make  the  talents  and  training  of  a technical  staff  available  to  those 
who  most  need  and  can  most  effectively  use  such  assistance. 

3 


And  third,  the  preparation  of  special  studies  for  organizations  and 
groups.  Fourth,  and  last,  is  our  newest  innovation, — a Washington  Bu- 
reau. At  present  it  is  very  modest,  requiring  only  the  part  time  of  one 
of  our  regular  members  of  the  staff.  None  the  less,  it  is  already  a val- 
uable contact  with  the  State  Department  and  the  Washington  correspond- 
ents. We  hope  that,  always  modest  in  demeanor  and  honest  in  purpose, 
it  will  grow  and  become  a vital  and  trusted  service  for  the  statesmen 
on  the  Hill  who  may  find  need  occasionally,  at  least,  for  factual  data  to 
supplement  their  own  researches. 

Our  task  is  to  make  it  a little  easier  for  our  democracy  to  know  some- 
thing more  about  the  underlying  factors  which  for  good  or  ill  are  weav- 
ing the  fate  of  America  into  the  warp  and  woof  of  the  fate  of  all  man- 
kind. In  short,  everything  that  the  Foreign  Policy  Association  is  now 
doing  and  everything  that  it  plans  to  do  is  based  on  the  belief  that  Elihu 
Root  was  right  when  he  said,  “A  democracy  which  undertakes  to  control 
its  own  foreign  relations  ought  to  know  something  about  the  subject.” 


Today’s  meeting  is  on  the  subject,  “A  Constructive  American  Foreign 
Policy.”  I congratulate  the  Association  in  having  induced  so  many  of 
its  members  and  friends  to  come  and  listen  to  the  discussion  of  a sub- 
ject which  really  concerns  them.  If  it  were  Russia  or  Fascist  Italy,  I 
should  not  be  surprised  at  the  crowded  attendance. 

There  are  to  be  two  speakers,- — one,  the  President  of  Columbia,  and 
the  other,  Mr.  Penfield,  a distinguished  American  diplomat.  Both  men 
have  kindly  agreed  to  the  schedule  which  we  have  worked  out  with  the 
radio,  which  is  a half-hour  for  each  talk,  leaving  us  a half-hour  for 
questions  and  discussion. 

The  first  speaker  is  Mr.  Penfield,  whose  list  of  accomplishments  in 
the  diplomatic  field  is  so  long  that  I would  take  all  of  his  half-hour  if  I 
were  to  read  them.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  he  was  formerly  counsel  at 
the  legations  of  Nicaragua,  Salvador,  Venezuela  and  the  Dominican  Re- 
public, Attorney  for  the  State  Department  from  1901  to  1904,  and  Tech- 
nical Adviser  for  Panama  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference. 

MR.  WALTER  SCOTT  PENFIELD 

Mr.  CHAIRMAN,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen : It  is  a privilege  to  be  in- 
vited to  speak  on  the  subject  of  “A  Constructive  American  For- 
eign Policy”  before  this  distinguished  audience,  composed  of  members 
of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association  of  New  York  City;  and  it  is  an  honor 
to  be  permitted  to  discuss  this  question  with  Dr.  Nicholas  Murray  But- 
ler, the  President  of  Columbia  University,  who  occupies  the  enviable 
position  of  being  an  able  educator,  a prominent  publicist  and  a brilliant 
internationalist. 


4 


The  subject  for  discussion  is  so  broad  and  includes  so  many  possible 
phases  that  it  is  rather  difficult  even  to  attempt  to  discuss  it  within  the 
space  of  time  allowed. 

The  only  thing  permanent  in  life  is  change.  It  is  constantly  about  us 
in  the  material  world.  As  it  goes  on,  our  American  foreign  policy  must 
necessarily  change  in  some  particulars  to  meet  the  new  international 
situations  that  may  confront  us ; and  yet  there  are  certain  phases  of  our 
foreign  policy  which  are  a permanent  part  of  us — policies  which  in  the 
lapse  of  years  since  their  adoption  have  proven  their  worth,  and  afforded 
us  protection  in  time  of  stress.  It  would  be  ideal  if  we  could  adopt 
formulae  by  which  our  foreign  policy  in  all  respects  could  be  definitely 
and  permanently  defined.  But  until  human  nature  changes  and  the  mil- 
lennium arrives,  that  would  appear  to  be  impracticable. 

Both  before  and  subsequent  to  our  independence  we  had  our  contacts 
and  relations  with  foreign  countries.  These  necessitated  the  inception  and 
maintenance  of  a foreign  policy.  Under  our  constitution  and  laws,  the 
President,  acting  through  his  Secretary  of  State,  is  charged  with  the  con- 
duct of  foreign  affairs.  The  latter  acts  through  his  foreign  service  offi- 
cers, to  whom  he  sends  instructions  and  from  whom  he  receives  reports, 
and  is  assisted  by  departmental  officials,  most  of  whom  have  served  in 
the  country  or  particular  group  of  countries  where  there  may  arise  a new 
question,  requiring  the  determination  by  the  Executive  as  to  what  our 
policy  should  be. 

When  such  a question  arises  the  President  reaches  his  decision  only 
after  conference  with  his  experts  and  study  of  his  documents.  The 
question  may  find  its  way  to  the  Committees  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
Senate  and  House.  It  may  be  debated  in  Congress.  It  may  be  published 
in  the  newspapers,  written  about  in  the  magazines,  discussed  in  societies 
such  as  this,  argued  by  men  in  their  daily  work  and  talked  over  by  women 
in  their  homes.  From  all  these  sources  our  American  foreign  policy  is 
finally  formulated. 

Is  it  not,  then,  rather  difficult  for  us  to  say  whether  the  policy  thus 
formed  is  or  is  not  constructive?  We  may  have  heard  the  debates  of 
Congress,  read  the  newspapers  and  magazines  and  been  present  at  dis- 
cussions in  societies  of  this  type,  but  unless  we  have  studied  the  confi- 
dential communications  from  our  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  abroad, 
and  availed  ourselves  of  the  information  possessed  by  our  experts  in  the 
Department  of  State,  we  are  not  fully  qualified  to  say  what  our  foreign 
policy  should  be  with  reference  to  a particular  question.  For  these 
reasons  when  questions — sometimes  somewhat  complicated  and  prolonged 
—-arise  between  our  Government  and  that  of  a foreign  country,  we 
should  not  hastily  criticize  the  policy  of  our  President  and  Secretary 
of  State. 

Your  conclusion  and  mine,  as  to  whether  we  have  a constructive  policy, 
is  a matter  of  individual  judgment.  A passive  policy  may  be  constructive. 

6 


In  diplomacy  it  is  often  better  to  know  what  not  to  do  than  to  know  what 
to  do.  To  do  nothing,- — to  follow  a passive  policy, — may  in  the  long  run 
be  a constructive  policy. 

In  reaching  a conclusion  as  to  what  a constructive  American  foreign 
policy  should  be,  would  it  not  be  well  for  us  to  consider  our  past  policies  ? 

In  his  farewell  address  Washington  cautioned  us  to  observe  good  faith 
and  justice  toward  all  nations  and  to  cultivate  peace  and  harmony  with 
all.  He  advised  us  it  would  be  unwise  to  implicate  ourselves  in  European 
politics  or  the  combinations  and  collisions  of  her  friendships  or  enmities. 
He  inquired,  “Why,  by  interweaving  our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part 
of  Europe,  entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of  European 
ambition,  rivalship,  interest,  humor,  or  caprice?”  Thomas  Jefferson 
in  his  first  inaugural  address  counselled  us  to  maintain  “peace,  commerce, 
and  honest  friendship  with  all  nations,  entangling  alliances  with  none.” 
The  doctrine  promulgated  by  President  Monroe  has  been  one  of  the 
beacons  in  our  foreign  policy.  His  declaration  and  counsel  are  as  vital 
today  for  our  national  protection  as  they  were  at  the  time  of  their  pro- 
nouncement in  1823. 

The  United  States  has  been  interested  in  treaties  of  arbitration.  In 
1908  it  made  conventions  for  the  arbitration  of  questions  of  a legal  na- 
ture, or  relating  to  the  interpretation  of  treaties,  provided  they  did  not 
affect  our  vital  interest,  independence,  or  honor. 

In  1911  treaties  were  signed,  but  not  ratified,  to  extend  the  scope  of 
those  of  1908,  so  as  to  exclude  the  exceptions  and  to  provide  for  the 
peaceful  solution  of  all  questions  of  difference  which  it  shall  be  found 
impossible  to  settle  by  diplomacy.  They  provided  for  the  arbitration  of 
differences  that  were  justiciable  in  their  nature,  those  that  were  sus- 
ceptible of  decision  by  the  application  of  the  principles  of  law  or  equity. 

In  1915  treaties  were  made  for  the  advancement  of  peace,  which  pro- 
vided that  all  disputes  be  submitted  for  investigation  and  report  to  a 
permanent  international  commission.  The  parties  agreed  not  to  resort 
to  any  act  of  force  during  the  investigation,  the  theory  being  that  it 
would  give  them  an  opportunity  to  cool  off  before  taking  any  action. 

The  United  States  has  had  a constructive  policy  with  reference  to  Cen- 
tral America.  It  initiated  two  conferences  of  those  countries,  both  held 
in  Washington,  the  first  in  1907  and  the  second  in  1923.  Among  the 
results  were  general  treaties  of  peace  and  amity,  conventions  providing 
that  those  governments  would  not  recognize  any  other  government  which 
might  come  into  power  in  any  of  the  Republics  as  a consequence  of  a 
revolution  against  the  recognized  government,  and  conventions  for  the 
establishment  of  a Central  American  Court  of  Justice. 

The  United  States  has  also  shown  a constructive  policy  in  regard  to 
all  of  the  countries  of  Latin  America  by  the  promotion  of  the  Pan  Amer- 
ican Conferences.  In  November,  1881,  James  G.  Blaine,  then  Secretary 
of  State,  issued  an  invitation  for  an  international  American  conference 

6 


“for  the  purpose  of  considering  and  discussing  the  methods  of  preventing 
war  between  the  nations  of  America.”  This  conference  was  never  held, 
but  in  1889  the  first  Pan-American  Conference  did  meet  as  the  result  of 
an  invitation  extended  by  Secretary  of  State  Bayard.  Since  then  five 
conferences  have  been  held.  At  the  sixth,  which  will  convene  in  Havana 
next  month,  twelve  projects  will  be  presented  pertaining  to  public  inter- 
national law.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  none  of  them  will  deal  with 
the  rules  and  regulations  of  international  war. 

The  United  States  showed  a constructive  policy  in  its  participation  in 
The  Hague  Conferences  of  1899  and  1907.  The  object  of  these  confer- 
ences was  to  secure  the  benefits  of  a real  and  enduring  peace.  Their  pro- 
grams included  limitation  of  armaments,  good  offices,  mediation  and  arbi- 
tration. 

The  United  States  can  well  point  with  pride  to  the  Washington  and 
Geneva  Disarmament  Conferences  and  to  the  part  it  played  in  providing 
the  membership  of  the  Dawes  Commission. 

After  the  war  came  the  Versailles  Treaty  and  the  discussion  concern- 
ing the  League  of  Nations.  Some  believed  that  we  ought  to  stay  out  of 
the  League.  Others  considered  that  our  failure  to  join  showed  a lack 
of  a constructive  policy.  The  League  has  proved  its  value  to  the  countries 
of  Europe  and  the  United  States  should  do  nothing  to  discourage  its 
existence.  But  the  majority  of  our  people  believe  they  voted  correctly 
when  they  decided  the  United  States  should  not  become  a party. 

An  incident  occurring  during  the  last  session  of  the  League  caused 
some  of  us  to  conclude  that  our  decision  to  refrain  from  membership 
had  been  wise.  It  was  a mere  gesture,  but,  in  case  we  had  been  a mem- 
ber, it  had  possibilities  of  proving  a source  of  embarrassment.  The  dele- 
gate of  Panama  raised  a question  as  to  whether,  under  the  treaty  between 
Panama  and  the  United  States  for  the  construction  of  the  Canal,  Panama 
transferred  to  the  United  States  its  right  of  sovereignty  over  the  Canal 
Zone,  or  only  conceded  to  the  United  States  the  power  and  authority  as 
though  the  United  States  were  sovereign.  He  suggested  that  if  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  did  not  accept  the  Panaman  interpretation 
there  then  remained  the  recourse  of  submitting  this  difference  to  the  de- 
cision of  a court  of  impartial  justice. 

If  the  United  States  had  been  a party  to  the  League,  it  seems  probable 
that  the  gesture  of  the  representative  of  Panama  would  have  gone 
further  and  that  we  might  have  been  required  to  submit  the  question  of 
our  sovereignty  over  the  Canal.  Would  there  be  anything  in  the  nature 
of  a constructive  foreign  policy  in  joining  a European  League  when  con- 
ceivably it  might  lead  to  the  loss  of  our  rights  to  the  Panama  Canal? 

We  have  always  favored  the  establishment  of  an  International  Court 
of  Justice.  The  present  World  Court  is  a wing  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
If  we  become  a party  to  that  court,  it  should  be  with  proper  reserva- 

7 


tions.  Otherwise  we  should  continue  to  decline  membership,  and  lend 
our  efforts  to  the  establishment  of  a new  court,  totally  divorced  from  the 
League. 

Today  we  have  our  international  problems.  Some  of  them  are  in  the 
countries  to  the  south  of  us.  While  our  effort  to  solve  the  Tacna-Arica 
dispute  has  not  yet  been  succesful,  it  was  a constructive  attempt  to  solve 
a long  pending  question  between  two  of  the  principal  governments  of 
South  America.  We  have  a problem  with  Nicaragua,  but  a reading  of 
the  documents  discloses  that  President  Coolidge  was  correct  in  uphold- 
ing the  sanctity  of  the  Central  American  Treaty  of  1923,  providing 
against  the  recognition  of  any  government  that  should  come  into  power 
through  a revolutionary  movement;  and  study  of  the  constitution  and 
laws  of  Nicaragua  makes  clear  that  the  recognition  of  the  Government 
of  Diaz  was  the  only  policy  that  the  President  could  properly  pursue. 

The  problem  with  Mexico  involves  the  constitution  of  1917  and  legis- 
lation enacted  subsequent  thereto  of  a confiscatory  and  retroactive  na- 
ture. It  has  required  the  greatest  amount  of  patience  but  the  revelations, 
if  correct,  of  our  newspapers  of  the  last  month  demonstrate  that  there 
is,  as  has  been  many  times  alleged,  a connection  between  Moscow  and 
Mexico  City,  and  that  at  least  prima-facie  evidence  has  been  produced 
which  would  tend  to  involve  the  Government  of  Mexico  in  the  promo- 
tion of  agitation  and  revolutionary  disorder  in  Nicaragua  as  well  as  else- 
where. 

The  Mexican  question  is  somewhat  related  to  that  of  Russia.  We 
do  not  desire  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Russia.  We  recog- 
nize its  right  to  develop  its  own  institutions.  But  when  it  comes  to  the 
matter  of  recognition,  the  questions  that  must  be  answered  must  be  with 
reference  to  its  disposition  to  discharge  its  international  obligations,  its 
assurance  of  the  validity  of  obligations,  and  its  guaranty  that  rights  shall 
not  be  repudiated  and  property  confiscated. 

In  our  relations  with  China  we  have  developed  constructive  policies — 
the  Open  Door,  the  maintenance  of  China’s  integrity,  equality  of  commer- 
cial opportunity,  cooperation  with  other  powers  in  the  declaration  of  com- 
mon principles,  limitation  of  naval  armament  and  of  fortifications  and 
naval  bases.  The  special  Customs  Conference  and  the  Commission  on 
Extraterritoriality  were  results  of  a constructive  policy.  But  while  the 
unfortunate  conflict  exists  in  China,  and  there  is  lacking  a responsible 
government  with  which  to  deal,  our  policy  must  necessarily  be  held  in 
abeyance.  The  chief  problem  in  China  is  that  of  internal  pacification. 

What  should  our  policy  be  with  reference  to  international  peace?  War 
is  an  abnormal  condition.  We  should  take  every  possible  step  to  prevent 
its  arising.  Can  this  be  accomplished  by  bringing  about  an  outlawry  of 
war? 

Among  the  most  interesting  suggestions  of  this  year  was  Monsieur 
Briand’s  proposal  of  perpetual  peace,  by  nations  agreeing  to  outlaw  war. 

8 


This  could  have  a favorable  reception  if  our  system  of  government  would 
permit  it.  While  authority  to  enter  such  a treaty  may  be  a part  of  the 
treaty-making  power,  declaring  the  President  empowered  to  make  treaties 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  this  power  does  not  abolish 
other  delegated  powers. 

Under  the  Constitution,  Congress  is  empowered  to  declare  war.  This 
is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  treaty-making  power  granted  to  the  Pres- 
ident and  Senate.  While  the  Constitution  gives  Congress  the  right  of  de- 
claring war,  neither  it  nor  any  other  organ  of  the  Government  can  abolish 
that  right.  At  any  time  that  it  sees  fit,  Congress  may  declare  war.  A 
present  Congress  cannot  prevent  a future  Congress  from  declaring  war 
whenever  it  may  deem  it  to  the  national  interest  to  do  so. 

Notwithstanding,  it  would  appear  that  the  President  and  Senate  have 
the  power  to  make  such  an  agreement  and  that  it  would  be  binding  on 
our  Government.  But  in  case  Congress  should  subsequently  desire  to 
declare  war,  it  would  have  the  inherent  right  to  do  so.  In  such  an  event 
the  law  of  the  land  would  be  the  declaration  of  war  and  not  the  treaty. 
It  is  a fundamental  principle  of  law  that  when  there  is  a conflict  between 
the  terms  of  a treaty  and  a law,  the  one  that  was  made  last  is  the  one 
that  would  be  effective.  So,  if  Congress  should  declare  war,  it  would 
thereby  repeal  the  treaty  so  far  as  domestic  law  is  concerned.  But  with 
reference  to  international  law  it  would  be  a case  of  breaking  a treaty 
and  we  would  stand  before  the  world  as  being  guilty  of  regarding  our 
treaty  as  a scrap  of  paper,  especially  if  the  world  should  judge  that  our 
act  of  war  was  without  just  foundation  or  cause.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, we  might  move  slowly  in  declaring  war,  when  we  knew  that  by 
doing  so  we  were  violating  the  terms  of  a treaty;  also  we  might  move 
slowly  in  making  such  a treaty,  if  we  thought  there  would  be  a possibility 
of  our  being  forced  for  self  protection  to  break  it. 

Undoubtedly  there  will  be  a public  demand  that  we  enter  into  such  a 
treaty.  But  from  observations  of  such  matters  in  Washington  it  is  not 
likely  that  the  Senate  will  consent  to  its  passage. 

In  1916,  Congress  declared  as  the  international  policy  of  the  United 
States  the  adjusting  and  settling  of  “its  international  disputes  through 
mediation  or  arbitration,  to  the  end  that  war  may  be  honorably  avoided,” 
and  stated  that  it  looked  “with  apprehension  and  disfavor  upon  a general 
increase  of  armament  throughout  the  world,”  but  realized  “that  no  single 
nation  can  disarm,  and  that  without  a common  agreement  upon  the  sub- 
ject every  considerable  power  must  maintain  a relative  standing  in  mili- 
tary strength.” 

In  December,  1926,  Senator  Borah,  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Senate,  introduced  a Resolution  providing  that  it 
is  the  view  of  the  Senate  that  war  between  nations  should  be  outlawed, 
making  it  a public  crime,  and  that  every  nation  should  be  encouraged  to 

9 


agree  to  punish  war  instigators  and  war  profiteers;  that  a code  of  inter- 
national law  for  peace  based  upon  the  outlawing  of  war  should  be  created 
and  that  a judicial  substitute  for  war  should  be  created  in  the  nature  of  an 
international  court  modeled  on  our  Federal  Supreme  Court. 

At  the  next  session  Congressman  Burton,  of  the  Committee  on  For- 
eign Affairs  of  the  House,  will  present  a joint  Resolution  declaring  it 
to  be  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  prohibit  the  exportation  of  arms, 
munitions  or  implements  of  war  to  any  country  which  engages  in  aggres- 
sive warfare  against  any  other  country  in  violation  of  a treaty,  conven- 
tion, or  other  agreement  to  resort  to  arbitration  or  other  peaceful  means 
for  the  settlement  of  international  controversies;  and  Senator  Capper  of 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Senate  will  introduce  a Reso- 
lution providing  for  the  renunciation  of  war  as  an  instrument  of  public 
policy  and  for  the  settlement  of  international  disputes  by  mediation,  arbi- 
tration and  conciliation. 

These  resolutions  demonstrate  the  desire  on  the  part  of  members  of 
Congress  to  promote  a constructive  foreign  policy. 

The  diplomatic  center  of  the  world  is  at  Washington.  In  that  city 
are  found  more  diplomatic  representatives  of  more  nations  than  are  ac- 
credited to  the  capitals  of  any  of  the  other  countries  of  the  world.  The 
United  States  is  today  the  most  powerful  nation.  How  are  we  going  to 
use  this  world  power?  Shall  it  be  in  the  martial  sense — in  the  terms  of 
aggressive  war;  or  in  the  moral  sense — ^in  the  terms  of  ideals?  Nations 
and  empires  have  risen  and  fallen.  If  we  are  to  preserve  ours,  it  must 
rest  on  principles  of  law  and  justice.  It  must  not  be  by  force.  Never 
have  we  had  an  opportunity  to  exercise  the  power  of  peace  as  we  have 
today.  Our  aims  have  always  tended  toward  peace,  even  though  on  oc- 
casions they  may  have  appeared  otherwise. 

But  who  and  what  should  determine  our  policy  of  peace?  Who  can  say 
whether  our  foreign  policy  of  the  future  will  be  constructive  or  other- 
wise? It  will  not  be  the  President,  Congress,  the  press,  or  the  people. 
It  will  be  public  opinion.  It  is  a matter  of  our  educating  from  a false 
to  a true  standard.  If  it  is  possible  to  educate  public  opinion  in  one 
country,  it  can  be  done  in  others,  and  eventually  we  may  have  a public 
opinion  which  will  be  international.  A law  does  not  make  men  good,  and 
a treaty  will  not  necessarily  make  nations  good.  This  has  been  proved  by 
the  frequent  breaking  of  laws  by  individuals  and  of  treaties  by  countries. 

Therefore,  in  order  to  enforce  national  or  international  law,  there  must 
be  public  opinion  back  of  it.  Then  and  only  then  is  it  a living  force. 
With  it  all  things  are  possible  and  without  it  there  is  little  for  which 
we  may  hope.  Public  opinion  is  a powerful  agency.  As  a former  officer 
of  the  League  has  stated,  there  should  “be  an  international  public  opinion 
which  will  insist  on  higher  standards  of  international  morality  in  inter- 
national dealings.” 


10 


Whether  our  foreign  policy  shall  be  constructive  or  other-wise  must 
necessarily  depend  on  international  developments.  Until  now  it  has  been 
constructive  and  is  constructive.  We  can  well  be  proud  of  the  world 
position  which  we  occupy.  The  nations  look  to  Washington  as  the 
greatest  diplomatic  center.  They  would  not  do  so  if  they  did  not  believe 
we  had  something  of  a constructive  nature  in  our  foreign  policy.  Whether 
you  believe  our  foreign  policy  to  be  constructive  or  otherwise,  I feel  con- 
fident you  will  agree  with  President  Coolidge  in  one  of  his  messages  to 
Congress,  when  he  said,  “The  policy  of  our  foreign  relations,  casting 
aside  any  suggestion  of  force,  rests  solely  on  the  foundation  of  peace, 
good  will,  and  good  works.” 

The  Chairman:  There  are  six  men  in  the  United  States  who  need 
no  introduction  to  an  American  audience.  One  of  these  is  the  President 
of  the  United  States.  Another  is  the  President  of  Columbia  University. 
Dr.  Butler! 


DR.  NICHOLAS  MURRAY  BUTLER 

Mr.  chairman.  Ladies  and  Gentlemen : The  situation  as  to  our 
foreign  policy  at  the  moment  appears  to  me  to  be  very  like  that 
which  Mark  Twain  described  in  regard  to  the  weather  in  Connecticut. 
He  said  that  everybody  complained  about  it,  but  nobody  did  anything 
about  it ! 

The  business  of  the  foreign  office  of  a government  may  be  conducted 
in  three  possible  ways.  That  office  may  pursue  a constructive  policy;  it 
may  pursue  a destructive  policy;  or  it  may,  like  Mr.  Micawber,  sit  with 
more  or  less  patience  waiting  for  something  to  turn  up.  That  is  appar- 
ently a popular  way. 

A destructive  foreign  policy  can  be  disposed  of  in  a sentence,  as  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  disposed  of  the  policy  of  Lord  Palmerston  when  he 
said  that  it  had  as  its  result  to  spread  confusion  everywhere.  Destruc- 
tive foreign  policy  is  more  often  than  not  the  result  of  unconsciousness, 
carelessness,  and  ignorance.  It  springs  from  lack  of  knowledge  of  other 
peoples  than  our  own,  from  lack  of  sympathy  with  their  forms  of  gov- 
ernment, or  with  those  who  differ  from  us  in  race,  in  color,  in  language, 
or  in  faith. 

Another  source  of  destructive  foreign  policy  is  the  ultra-legalistic  point 
of  view.  The  moment  that  a foreign  minister  regards  himself  as  attor- 
ney with  his  country  as  client-litigant,  that  moment  the  fat  is  in  the  fire. 
Foreign  relations  are  not  to  be  conceived  or  dealt  with  as  matters  of  liti- 
gation. They  are  to  be  conceived  and  dealt  with  as  relations  offering 
opportunity  for  association,  for  cooperation,  for  mutual  advantage,  and 
for  public  benefit  and  the  advance  of  civilization.  In  them,  the  legalistic 
point  of  view  and  the  legalistic  method  should  always  and  everywhere 
be  subordinate.  It  cannot  be  mere  chance  that  no  lawyer  has  ever  been 

11 


at  the  head  of  the  Foreign  Office  of  the  British  Government  since  that 
office  was  established  in  its  present  form  in  1782. 

The  habit  of  drifting  Micawber-like  is  only  a shade  less  discreditable 
than  the  habit  of  building  up  or  permitting  a destructive  foreign  policy. 
It  is,  of  course,  the  result  of  lack  of  information,  of  cowardice,  of  lack 
of  initiative,  of  lack  of  vision.  Nobody  would  defend  it,  even  if  he 
illustrated  it. 

A constructive  foreign  policy  will  start  from  certain  definite  premises 
and  principles  and  proceed  steadily  toward  the  accomplishment  of  pre- 
cise, fixed  and  high  ideals. 

We  in  the  United  States  are  under  difficulties  which  other  nations 
are  only  now  coming  to  understand  and  appreciate,  and  which  we  our- 
selves are  only  now  coming  to  understand  and  appreciate,  in  the  devel- 
opment of  a constructive  foreign  policy  continuing  over  a long  period 
of  time.  Those  difficulties  arise  from  the  construction  and  operation  of 
our  form  of  government.  They  were  set  out  with  precision  and  care  by 
Mr.  Justice  Sutherland  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  lectures 
delivered  in  the  Blumenthal  Foundation  at  Columbia  University  while 
he  was  Senator,  entitled  “Constitutional  Power  and  World  Affairs.” 

Justice  Sutherland  showed  there  very  clearly  what  the  structural 
difficulties  are  under  which  our  Government  operates  in  building  up 
and  carrying  on  foreign  policy.  A very  important  principle  was  written 
into  the  Constitution  when  it  was  provided  that  the  President  may,  by 
and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  make  treaties,  provided 
that  two-thirds  of  the  Senators  present  concur.  Of  course,  under  our 
form  of  government,  it  would  be  quite  inconceivable  that  the  executive 
alone  should  be  entrusted  with  those  great  and  perhaps  epochal  decisions. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  of  the  highest  importance  that  into  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate  and  into  its  concurrence,  the  lower,  baser, 
more  partisan,  more  personal  motives  should  not  be  permitted  to  enter. 
There  must  be  understanding  and  cooperation  between  the  President  and 
the  Senate  or  we  are  paralyzed  in  our  international  relations,  and  it  is 
for  us  to  fix  the  responsibility  for  lack  of  cooperation,  and  to  remedy  it 
by  those  methods  which  are  in  our  hands  as  the  governing  force  in  this 
republic,  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

For  example,  at  the  present  time,  the  Senate,  by  its  insistence  upon 
regarding  every  agreement  made  under  a treaty  of  arbitration  as  a new 
and  separate  treaty,  deprives  arbitration  treaties  of  all  but  rhetorical 
value.  If,  every  time  there  is  to  be  an  arbitration  under  a treaty,  the 
agreement  so  to  arbitrate  is  to  be  a new  treaty,  then  all  you  have  done 
by  your  arbitration  treaty,  widely  heralded  and  approved,  is  to  express  a 
pious  wish. 

Mother,  may  I go  in  to  swim? 

Yes,  my  darling  daughter. 

Hang  your  clothes  on  the  hickory  limb. 

But  don’t  go  near  the  water. 

12 


In  the  next  place,  we  are  often  under  embarrassment  due  to  that 
provision  of  our  public  law  to  which  Mr.  Penfield  has  alluded  in  his 
very  interesting  survey  of  this  subject.  It  is  the  law  of  the  land  that 
either  a treaty  or  a statute  may  repeal  the  other  to  which  it  is  subsequent, 
despite  the  fact  that  the  treaty  has  required  the  assent  of  another  nation, 
while  the  modifying  or  repealing  statute  may  be  adopted  without  any 
reference  whatever  to  that  other  nation.  The  outstanding  case,  of  course, 
is  that  of  Chinese  immigration.  The  Chinese  had  certain  rights  as  im- 
migrants in  the  United  States  under  a treaty  which  was  the  law  of  the 
land.  That  treaty  might  have  been  denounced,  might  have  been  amended, 
might  have  been  revoked,  might  have  had  something  substituted  for  it 
by  the  ordinary  methods  of  discussion,  consideration  and  diplomatic  in- 
tercourse. Instead  of  that,  our  Congress  followed  the  course,  legally  pos- 
sible but  impolite,  of  enacting  a statute  in  flat  contradiction  with  the 
treaty,  and  it  was  not  so  many  years  afterwards  that  we  were  calling  the 
Germans  names  for  doing  something  not  dissimilar. 

It  is  pretty  important  for  us  to  realize  that,  having  that  power,  it  is 
heavily  incumbent  upon  us  to  exercise  it  with  consideration,  with  good 
manners,  and  that  when  a situation  of  that  sort  arises,  we  should  deal 
with  it  not  rudely,  brusquely,  inconsiderately,  but  kindly,  after  consider- 
ation, consultation  and  discussion,  and  full  explanation  of  our  changed 
point  of  view. 

I remember  very  well  having  explained  that  provision  of  our  public 
law  to  the  last  German  Emperor.  He  expressed  his  profound  surprise 
and  asked  me  to  repeat  my  statement  in  the  presence  of  the  Chief  of  his 
Civil  Cabinet,  His  Excellency,  von  Lucanus.  I repeated  my  statement 
definitely  and  precisely,  whereupon,  turning  to  von  Lucanus  with  a sharp 
gesture,  the  Emperor  said,  “Tell  them  at  the  Foreign  Office  never  to 
make  another  treaty  with  the  United  States.  With  that  provision  of  their 
public  law,  their  treaty  is  valueless.” 

You  can  understand  how  that  point  of  view  will  be  taken  by  the  rep- 
resentative of  another  nation  that  finds  a carefully  considered  interna- 
tional engagement  modified  or  wiped  out  by  the  legislative  act  of  one  of 
the  parties  thereto.  The  law  is  clear.  The  Congress  has  the  right. 
Therefore,  it  is  doubly  incumbent  upon  us  not  to  use  it  in  violation  of 
a plighted  engagement  if  we  are  going  to  have  the  good-will  of  the  world 
or  its  respect,  and  if  we  are  going  to  promote  those  international  relations 
at  which  we  profess  to  aim. 

There  is  no  good  reason  why  a government  should  not  acquire  and 
manifest  the  manners  of  a gentleman.  Bad  manners  have  been  at  the 
bottom  of  many  of  our  most  vexatious  international  difficulties.  Elihu 
Root  has  referred  to  that  fact  again  and  again,  and  in  the  course  of  his 
notable  trip  to  Latin  America  in  1906,  he  found  many  manifestations 
of  it.  Remember  that  a generation  ago,  when  the  question  of  Irish 
home-rule  was  acute,  hardly  a week  passed  that  in  the  Congress  of  the 

13 


United  States,  in  a state  legislature,  in  a board  of  aldermen,  on  a public 
platform,  something  was  not  said  or  done  that  gave  grave  offense  to  the 
friendliest  of  foreign  nations.  What  do  you  suppose  we  should  have 
thought  if  we  were  bombarded  by  resolutions,  protests,  declarations  of 
Parliament,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  the  Reichstag,  calling  attention  to 
the  fact  that  we  lynched  negroes  or  that  the  Ku  Klux  Klan  manifests 
various  odd  activities,  or  that  there  is  a city  called  Chicago,  or  that 
there  had  been  some  other  manifestation  of  what  Mr.  H.  L.  Mencken 
calls  the  “moron  part”  of  our  population.  We  can  get  nowhere,  my 
friends,  without  good  manners.  It  has  been  pointed  out  time  and  again 
that  a rude,  ill-natured  passionate  speech  delivered  on  the  floor  of  the 
Senate,  however  irresponsible  the  Senator,  may  undo  the  work  of  years 
in  bringing  about  friendly  and  kindly  relations  with  another  people. 

I should  say  that  one  of  the  very  first  things  to  which  to  address  our- 
selves would  be  to  gain  the  information  of  which  the  Chairman  has 
spoken,  and  then  to  cultivate  a type  of  international  good  manners  that 
will  promote  kindliness  and  understanding,  that  will  remember  there  are 
other  points  of  view,  other  traditions,  other  forms  of  government  than 
our  own,  and  that  they  are  all  entitled  to  consideration  and  hearing  in 
the  mind  and  policy  of  any  self-governing  people  which  stands  in  rela- 
tions with  them. 

We  began  our  foreign  relations  on  a very  high  plane.  That  was,  I 
think,  in  part  because  of  the  temper  of  our  people  and  in  part  because 
of  the  men  who  negotiated  the  treaties  and  conducted  our  foreign  rela- 
tions. When  Benjamin  Franklin,  John  Adams,  Thomas  Jefferson,  and 
Henry  Laurens  were  writing  treaties,  they  were  pretty  sure  to  be  treaties 
on  a high  plane.  We  were  not  ashamed  then,  in  Mr.  Jefferson’s  epoch- 
making  words,  “to  show  a decent  respect  for  the  opinions  of  mankind,” 
and  we  so  framed  and  so  guided  our  policies.  We  had  not  then  climbed 
to  that  height  of  virtuous  isolation  from  which  we  can  see  nobody  and 
fatuously  imagine  that  nobody  can  see  us. 

Our  earliest  treaties— the  famous  treaty  with  Prussia  of  1782,  a very 
model  of  its  kind,  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Great  Britain  in  1782,  ad- 
mirable in  its  humane*  and  farsighted  provisions,  and  the  first  treaty, 
our  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce  with  France  in  1778,  which  is  an 
epoch-making  document — were  all  on  the  highest  plane.  We  have  never 
since  been  on  a higher  plane,  if  as  high. 

John  Quincy  Adams  wrote,  in  the  preamble  of  that  French  treaty,  that 
it  stood  in  the  same  relation  to  our  commercial  intercourse  with  foreign 
nations  that  the  Declaration  of  Independence  did  to  our  domestic  institu- 
tions. There  is  where  we  started,  and  our  great  Secretaries  of  State, 
of  whom  the  master  builders  have  been  John  Quincy  Adams,  Daniel 
Webster,  William  H.  Seward,  Hamilton  Fish  and  Elihu  Root,  have  always 
walked  on  that  lofty,  high-principled  and  well  considered  path. 

14 


In  the  memory  of  most  of  us  here,  from  McKinley  to  Wilson,  we  were 
making  history  in  constructive  international  policy,  regardless  of  party. 
Then  came  the  unhappy,  the  disastrous  and  the  wrecking  differences  of 
1919.  Eight  years  have  passed.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  time  has  come  to 
say  “Onward  march,”  and  to  resume  the  constructive  policies  that  we 
were  pursuing  when  interrupted  by  factional  and  personal  difference  and 
dispute.  The  time  has  come  to  take  the  outstretched  hand  that  has  been 
offered  us  and  to  declare  the  policy  of  the  United  States  in  terms  that 
our  people  desire  and  applaud  and  that  the  whole  world  can  understand. 

When  the  Senate  convenes  on  Monday,  Senator  Capper  of  Kansas,  a 
member  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  is  going  to  introduce  the 
joint  resolution  which  Mr.  Penfield  has  described.  Mr.  Penfield  feels 
that  nothing  is  going  to  be  done  about  it.  We  propose  to  see  whether 
anything  is  going  to  be  done  about  it.  If  that  be  considered  a question 
for  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  alone,  some  gentlemen  in  Washington 
are  going  to  find  themselves  mistaken.  It  is  a question  upon  which  the 
people  of  the  United  States  will  express  themselves.  Everything  that 
Mr.  Penfield  has  said  is  sound  law.  The  Congress  has  the  right,  always 
will  have  the  right,  to  declare  war.  When  it  got  that  right,  the  country 
had  already  said  it  would  not  go  to  war  with  France,  with  England,  and 
with  Prussia,  and  we  have  said  it  some  thirty  times  since.  We  can  break 
our  word  if  we  choose,  of  course.  No  power  can  prevent  us.  We  can 
break  our  word,  if  we  choose.  But  if  we  join  nations  on  a like  plane 
of  civilization  in  saying  that  in  our  dealings  with  each  other  we  do  not 
contemplate  fighting,  that  we  contemplate  only  discussion,  only  concilia- 
tion, only  arbitration,  and  in  the  extreme  case  judicial  settlement,  and 
that  we  have  reached  a civilized  point  where  we  are  not  going  to  consider 
fighting  them,  and  if  the  five  nations  named  by  Senator  Capper  say  that — • 
and  they  are  ready  to  say  it  to  us  if  we  are  ready  to  say  it  to  them — 
believe  me,  so  long  as  those  nations  and  ours  keep  their  word,  war  of  a 
serious  kind  will  have  a much  harder  time  in  breaking  out  than  it  has 
now. 

This  is  wholly  different  from  the  proposal  to  outlaw  war.  You  can 
not  outlaw  war.  You  can  not  outlaw  any  of  the  exhibitions  of  human 
passion.  I should  think  anybody  who  had  read  the  Eighteenth  Amend- 
ment would  know  what  happens  when  you  try  to  do  things  like  that. 
But  what  you  can  do  is  to  say, — the  authority  that  has  the  right  may  say, — 
“I  am  not  going  to  do  this  thing!”  The  Congress  of  the  United  States 
has  power  to  issue  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal,  that  is,  to  commission 
privateers  to  prey  upon  the  commerce  of  other  nations  at  sea.  Can 
you  contemplate  them  doing  it?  No,  Mr.  Chairman,  we  must  construe 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  in  the  light  of  a great  charter  to 
adapt  itself  to  the  moving  and  developing  and  liberalizing  opinion  of  an 
increasingly  civilized  state  of  mankind. 

We  are  not  tied  to  declare  war  because  we  have  the  power  to  do  it, 
and  we  certainly  are  not  to  be  prevented  from  saying  that  we  will  not 

16 


do  it  in  respect  to  a nation  on  a like  plane  of  civilization  that  is  ready 
to  say  the  same  thing  to  us. 

Senator  Capper  has  done  another  thing.  He  has  included  in  his  reso- 
lution a definition  of  an  aggressor  nation.  I know  the  answer  of  the 
legalist.  “You  can  not  do  that.  Any  foreign  office  would  be  clever 
enough  so  to  state  the  case  that  you  could  not  possibly  manage  that.” 
But,  if  a schoolchild  can  not  understand  Senator  Capper’s  definition, 
then  the  schoolchild  is  entitled  to  one  seat  I know  of  in  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States.  I quote  the  resolution : “To  accept  the  definition  of 
aggressor  nation  as  one  which,  having  agreed  to  submit  international 
differences  to  conciliation,  arbitration,  or  judicial  settlement,  begins  hos- 
tilities without  having  done  so.”  If  a country  has  not  so  agreed,  it  can  not 
carry  on  an  aggressive  war  under  that  definition,  but  everybody  would 
be  on  the  lookout  for  it  anyhow.  But  if  it  has  so  agreed,  there  it  is. 
And  they  do  not  seem  to  realize  in  Washington  that  Germany,  France, 
Great  Britain,  Italy,  Czechoslovakia,  Poland,  and  Belgium  have  already 
done  it  at  Locarno.  It  is  done. 

We  can  not  do  it  because,  why?  I do  not  know,  and  should  like  to  be 
informed  by  somebody,  because,  of  course,  until  you  get  this  definition, 
there  never  will  be  an  aggressive  war.  Every  war  has  always  begun 
because  the  party  which  began  it  was  just  going  to  be  attacked  by  some- 
body else,  and  he  had  to  do  it  to  prevent  being  over-run.  A hundred 
years  from  now,  the  historians  are  still  going  to  be  arguing  about  who 
really  started  the  war  of  1914.  But  if  there  is  a definite,  precise  agree- 
ment to  submit  international  differences  to  these  methods  of  conciliation 
and  you  begin  hostilities,  and  we  know  what  they  are, — invasion  of  ter- 
ritory, destruction  of  life  or  property  in  another  territory,— if  you  begin 
that  sort  of  thing  without  having  kept  your  word,  then  you  are  an 
aggressor  nation,  and  we  know  how  to  deal  with  you. 

It  seems  to  me  anyone  not  hopelessly  befogged  in  legalism  can  under- 
stand that. 

My  friends,  here  is  the  practical  situation:  There  are  in  this  country 
and  gathered  in  considerable  number  at  “the  great  diplomatic  center  of 
Washington”  a large  number  of  people  who  want  to  go  on  talking  about 
peace  but  who  are  alarmed  to  the  point  of  apoplexy  if  you  ask  them  to 
do  anything  about  it.  They  want  to  argue.  They  have  some  other 
plan.  They  think  the  world  of  bringing  the  nations  together  in  an  asso- 
ciation to  promote  good  order  and  peace,  but  never  for  a moment  in  the 
League  of  Nations — something  else.  They  are  all  for  a court,  but  not 
this  Court.  They  are  all  for  preventing  aggressive  war,  but  not  for  this 
definition  of  aggressive  war.  Now  the  time  has  come,  in  Senator  Capper’s 
language,  to  test  the  sincerity  of  the  American  people  and  the  American 
Government.  Are  you  to  treat  us  indefinitely  to  talk,  or  are  we  going  to 
have  action  ? Are  we  once  more  to  be  back  where  our  grandfathers  were 

16 


sixty  years  ago  when  James  Russell  Lowell  so  charmingly  described  the 
politicians  of  that  day : 

“A  marciful  Providence  fashioned  us  holler, 

O’purpose  that  we  might  our  principles  swaller.” 

Mr.  Chairman,  Abraham  Lincoln,  speaking  at  Ottowa  in  his  first  de- 
bate with  Douglas,  said,  “Public  sentiment  is  everything.  With  public 
sentiment,  nothing  can  fail.  Without  it,  nothing  can  succeed.  Conse- 
quently he  who  molds  public  sentiment  goes  deeper  than  he  who  enacts 
statutes  or  pronounces  decisions.” 

My  appeal  is  to  the  public  sentiment  of  America  to  act  on  this  practical, 
simple,  consistent  declaration,  to  say  to  ourselves  and  to  the  world  that 
we  are  ready  to  this  extent  to  manifest  that  Will  to  Peace  which  is  the 
only  thing  that  can  establish  the  Habit  of  Peace. 

The  Chairman:  Now  we  have  one-half  hour,  and  not  more,  of 
question  and  discussion.  The  Chairman  would  like  to  emphasize  that, 
knowing  how  many  brilliant  speakers  there  are  on  the  floor,  he  would 
prefer  that  they  for  today  limit  themselves  to  short  questions.  Otherwise 
their  brilliancy  would  be  lost  upon  the  more  important  part  of  the  audience, 
that  portion  which  is  not  in  this  room.  Where  is  the  first  question,  either 
written  or  oral? 

Mr.  Colt:  I should  like  to  ask  Mr.  Penfield  a question.  His  state- 
ment happened  to  be  quite  different  from  my  point  of  view,  which  is  that 
of  those  people,  courageous  but  probably  of  poor  judgment,  who  might 
have  been  willing  to  have  had  this  country  take  the  frightful  risk  of 
entering  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  question  is : Why  did  Mr.  Penfield  state  that  the  League  of  Nations 
is  a European  League? 

Mr.  Penfield:  Well,  in  the  first  place,  all  of  the  countries  of  the 
world  do  not  belong  to  the  League  of  Nations.  I used  the  expression 
“European  League”  because  it  sits  at  Geneva  in  Europe.  I presume  there 
would  be  no  objection  to  calling  it  a World  League.  It  was  merely  a 
phrase  of  mine  in  referring  to  the  League  of  Nations  as  a European 
League. 

Prof.  Chamberlain  : May  I ask  Mr.  Penfield  a question  just  to  clear 
up  a doubt  which  arose  in  my  mind  ? He  spoke  with  approval,  I thought, 
of  the  Bryan  Treaties  of  Conciliation.  Those  treaties  provided  that  the 
United  States  should  not  go  to  war  for  a period  of  one  year  after  a ques- 
tion arising  between  them  and  another  signatory  power  had  been  sub- 
mitted to  a conciliation  commission.  That,  I understood,  was  a limitation 
by  international  agreement  on  the  declaration  of  war. 

Another  question  is  on  the  Treaty  of  Washington  of  1922,  by  which 
the  United  States  entered  into  an  engagement  with  a number  of  other 

17 


nations,  including  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  not  to  build  a navy  in  excess  of 
the  amount  provided  in  the  treaty.  The  Constitution  provides  expressly,  as 
Mr.  Penfield  knows,  that  Congress  shall  have  the  power  to  raise  and 
equip  navies.  That  is  an  unlimited  power.  Are  those  two  treaties — the 
Bryan  Treaty,  because  it  is  an  engagement  by  the  United  States  not  to 
declare  war  for  a year  after  a dispute  has  arisen,  and  the  Washington 
Treaty  of  1922,  because  it  is  an  international  engagement  to  limit  the 
navy  of  the  United  States — without  the  treaty  power  of  the  United 
States  because  they  affect  two  powers  of  Congress? 

The  Chairman:  May  I summarize  Professor  Chamberlain’s  question 
for  the  benefit  of  the  radio  audience?  I am  sorry,  but  Professor  Cham- 
berlain was  not  heard  in  Chicago  when  he  gave  that  question. 

His  question  is  addressed  to  Mr.  Penfield.  Professor  Chamberlain  re- 
minds you  of  the  provision  of  the  so-called  Bryan  treaties  of  delay,  which 
promised  that  Congress  would  not  declare  war  within  a year  after  a given 
circumstance  arose,  and  the  treaties  which  followed  the  Washington  con- 
ference, limiting  the  size  of  the  navies  which  Congress  would  build.  Pro- 
fessor Chamberlain  asks  whether  Mr.  Penfield  thinks  that  the  same  diffi- 
culty does  not  apply  to  these  unquestionably  binding  and  legal  treaties  as 
he  seemed  to  see  in  such  a provision  as  that  referred  to  in  Senator  Cap- 
per’s proposal  and  spoken  of  by  Dr.  Butler. 

Mr.  Penfield:  Professor  Chamberlain,  I believe  in  the  draft  of  the 
treaty  which  Professor  Shotwell  and  you  prepared  and  which  I have  read 
with  much  interest,  being  developed,  as  Dr.  Butler  says,  as  a result  of  the 
spirit  of  the  Treaty  of  Locarno,  that  you  have  in  the  first  article  of  that 
treaty  a provision  against  aggressive  war.  If  your  treaty  were  adopted 
by  this  Government,  it  would  be  open  to  the  legal  objection  that  I raise  in 
regard  to  the  Capper  Treaty,  namely,  that  it  tends  to  bind  the  United 
States  without  authority  to  do  so,  in  view  of  the  provision  of  the  Constitu- 
tion which  gives  to  Congress  inherent  right  to  declare  war. 

In  your  Bryan  Treaty  it  is  true  that  there  is  an  agreement  there  to  let, 
I think,  a year  go  by  during  which  time  the  Commission  on  Conciliation 
can  pass  on  the  question,  but  under  your  treaty,  as  I understand  it,  we 
can  not  go  to  war  at  all,  that  is,  we  cannot  go  into  an  aggressive  war. 
Is  that  correct? 

Professor  Chamberlain  : That  is  wrong. 

Mr.  Penfield:  But  Professor  Chamberlain  your  model  treaty  does 

provide  in  Article  I that  “the  United  States  of  America  and 

mutually  undertake  that  they  will  in  no  case  attack  or  invade  each  other 
or  resort  to  war  against  each  other.”  The  Washington  Conference  treaty 
deals  with  the  limitation  of  the  size  of  navies.  Under  the  Bryan  treaties 
we  are  not  permanently  bound  not  to  go  to  war. 

I do  not  see  any  objection  to  our  entering  into  your  type  of  treaty  if  we 
will  keep  our  word,  but  I do  not  think  that  you  can  bind  Congress  per- 

18 


petually  with  that  type  of  a treaty.  Congress  reserves  to  itself  its  con- 
stitutional right  all  the  time  to  declare  war  whenever  it  deems  it  best  for 
national  reasons  to  do  so. 

There  is  a vast  difference  between  this  important  right  and  that  of  the 
Washington  treaty,  which  merely  limits  our  right  as  to  battleships,  or 
that  of  the  Bryan  treaty,  which  merely  postpones  for  a year  our  right 
to  declare  war. 

Professor  Chamberlain  ; May  I,  just  to  clinch  that  point,  say  that,  as 
the  Washington  Conference  and  the  Bryan  Treaties  depend  also  on  Con- 
gress’ keeping  its  word,  it  seems  to  me  that  Mr.  Penfield’s  objection  to  the 
Treaty  with  which  my  name  is  connected  applies  equally  to  the  very 
dangerous  Washington  Treaty  and  the  equally  dangerous  Bryan  Treaty. 

Mr.  Kelsey  : First,  following  in  the  line  of  Dr.  Butler’s  very  interest- 
ing and  able  and  convincing  statement  in  regard  to  Senator  Capper, 
would  it  not  be  well  for  every  member  of  this  Association  present  and 
absent  to  write  to  Senator  Capper  or  telegraph  him  your  and  our  com- 
mendation of  the  splendid  position  he  has  taken  which  comes  like  a 
beacon  of  light  out  of  the  Midwest. 

The  next  point ! Some  of  us  who  have  been  watching  this  question  for 
a number  of  years  with  a great  deal  of  interest,  as  members  of  this  Asso- 
ciation— a non-partisan  Association  from  its  beginning, — and  a number  of 
other  associations,  are  interested  in  one  point  to  which  I shall  refer  in 
the  other  minute,  if  Mr.  McDonald  will  allow  me,  and  that  is  this:  We 
have  about  seventy-five  different  peace  organizations.  They  are  going  in 
this  direction  and  that  direction  and  that  direction  and  that  direction,  all 
having  a common  purpose,  namely,  the  continuation  of  peace  and  cordial 
and  amicable  relations  between  nations.  It  has  occurred  to  some  of 
us,  and  I sent  to  the  Foreign  Policy  Association  and  one  or  two  others 
as  long  ago  as  March,  a resolution  in  which  I suggested  that  it  would 
be  desirable  and  in  every  way  practicable  that  a dozen  or  fifteen  of 
these  leading  organizations  appoint  a special  committee  of  five,  perhaps, 
with  power,  and  that  the  committees  of  these  dozen  associations  unite  and 
form  a central  committee  of  perhaps  five  or  ten  of  the  best  men  in  the 
country.  That  central  committee  could  then  speak  for  all  of  these  or- 
ganizations in  a united  effort  to  take  these  questions  up  with  the  President 
or  the  Secretary  of  State  and  that  Committee  would  have  the  hearing 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  people  all  over  the 
United  States. 

The  Chairman:  I have  a question  addressed  to  Mr.  Penfield  but  I 
should  feel  badly  if  you  let  Dr.  Butler  off  without  something  besides  your 
cheers.  I should  feel  that  he  was  not  being  treated  as  a regular  member 
of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association. 

Question  : May  I ask  Dr.  Butler  a question  ? As  long  as  we  are  in 

19 


this  rather  absurd  position  of  having  one  group  in  Congress  wipe  out 
everything  that  the  other  group,  the  Senate  and  the  Secretary  of  State 
and  the  President,  may  do,  would  it  not  be  a much  simpler  way  to  prevent 
war  if  he  were  to  take  away  from  Congress  the  power  to  do  it? 

The  Chairman  : The  lady  asks  Dr.  Butler  whether  a simpler  way  out 
of  this  dilemma  would  not  be  to  take  away  from  Congress  the  power  to 
declare  war. 

Dr.  Butler:  The  simplicity  of  that  is  admirable.  It  would  only  re- 
quire that  Congress  should  submit,  by  vote  of  two-thirds  of  each  House, 
and  that  the  legislatures  of  three-fourths  of  the  states  should  ratify  by  a 
majority  vote  of  each  of  the  two  houses,  a proposal  to  that  effect.  I 
think  therefore  the  difficulty  is  not  theoretical,  merely  legislative. 

The  Chairman:  Here  is  a question  addressed  to  Mr.  Penfield:  Does 
Mr.  Penfield  base  his  belief  in  a Moscow-Mexico  combination  merely  on 
the  so-called  disclosures  of  the  Hearst  papers  or  on  something  else?  If 
the  latter,  what? 

Mr.  Penfield:  To  answer  that  question  in  the  affirmative  would  not 
be  satisfactory  to  the  inquirer.  I said  that  it  created  a prima-facie  case. 
I might  say  that  I have  been  in  Mexico  and  I have  studied  that  situation. 
I do  not  consider  that  Mexico  is  a Bolshevik  government,  but  I consider 
that  it  has  adopted  Bolshevik  methods.  I would  dislike  very  much  to  say 
anything  that  would  tend  in  any  way  to  mar  the  situation  that  is  bettering 
between  Mexico  and  the  United  States  today,  but  I base  my  statement 
partly  on  my  observations  in  Mexico,  in  Vera  Cruz,  where  I saw  Bol- 
shevik parades,  and  in  Orizaba,  half  way  up  between  Vera  Cruz  and 
Mexico  City,  and  because  I believe  that  the  disclosures  of  the  newspapers 
of  the  past  few  days  may  have  a considerable  element  of  truth  in  them. 
But  perhaps  at  the  tail  end  of  my  paragraph  where  I was  discussing  the 
Mexican  situation  and  stating  that  our  Government  has  exercised  the 
greatest  amount  of  patience  in  handling  it,  I should  have  reminded  this 
audience  that  several  months  ago  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State  were  under  most  severe  criticism  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  press 
and  many  of  the  people  of  this  country  because  of  our  so-called  Mexican 
policy,  and  if  the  revelations  of  the  Hearst  newspapers  of  the  past  two 
weeks  are  correct,  I think  that  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  State 
without  doubt  have  been  upheld  in  the  policy  that  they  pursued  with 
reference  to  that  country. 

The  Chairman  : I would  like  to  ask  one  of  the  men  at  the  guest  table, 
Mr.  Austen  G.  Fox,  who  is  a trustee  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment,  to  read 
a very  short  statement  from  an  historical  document  in  refernce  to  one 
phase  of  the  discussion  which  has  been  before  us  today. 

Mr.  Fox:  This  is  not  mine,  and  it  is  owing  to  Dr.  Butler’s  suggestion 
that  I show  it  to  Mr.  McDonald,  that  I now  find  myself  in  this  predica- 
ment,— and  so  do  you. 


20 


In  The  American  Crisis  of  December,  1793,  I came  across  the  following 
words : 

“America  need  never  be  ashamed  to  tell  her  birth,  nor  relate  the 
stages  by  which  she  rose  to  empire.  . . The  world  has  seen  her  great 
in  adversity;  struggling,  without  a thought  of  yielding,  beneath  ac- 
cumulated difficulties,  bravely,  nay  proudly,  encountering  distress,  and 
rising  in  resolution  as  the  storm  increased.  All  this  is  justly  due  to 
her,  for  her  fortitude  has  merited  the  character.  Let,  then,  the  world 
see  that  she  can  bear  prosperity,  and  that  her  honest  virtue  in  time 
of  peace  is  equal  to  the  bravest  virtue  in  time  of  war.  She  is  now 
descending  to  the  scenes  of  quiet  and  domestic  life.  . . In  this  situa- 
tion may  she  never  forget  that  a fair  national  reputation  is  of  as  much 
importance  as  independence.  That  it  possesses  a charm  that  wins 
upon  the  world  and  makes  even  enemies  civil.  That  it  gives  a dignity 
which  is  often  superior  to  power,  and  commands  respect  where  pomp 
and  splendor  fail.” 

The  Chairman:  We  have  ten  and  one-half  minutes  more.  I have 
one  or  two  questions  here  addressed  to  Mr.  Penfiield  but  it  seems  to  me 
he  has  been  working  rather  hard. 

Just  half  a moment ! Here  is  one  addressed  to  Dr.  Butler : To  what 
extent  would  such  commitments  as  implied  in  the  Capper  resolution 
ignore  the  factor  of  inevitable  changes  in  national  and  international  situa- 
tions and  opinions? 

Dr.  Butler:  No  more  than  the  power  to  declare  war.  It  is  just  a 
declaration  of  policy.  They  are  on  the  same  plane  exactly. 

The  Chairman:  A question  addressed  to  Mr.  Penfield,  I assume: 
Does  the  United  States  wish  to  retain  the  right  to  go  to  aggressive  war  ? 

Mr.  Penfield  : I would  refer  you  in  that  question,  as  to  whether  the 
United  States  wished  to  retain  the  right  to  go  to  aggressive  war,  to  the 
young  lady  in  the  rear  of  the  ball  room  who  asked  whether  we  could  not 
get  rid  of  war  by  amending  that  part  of  our  Constitution  which  gives 
Congress  the  power  to  declare  war. 

Mr.  Holt:  I heard  the  speech  by  the  Panama  delegate  at  the  Eighth 
Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  last  September  in  which  he  said  that 
Panama  claimed  the  United  States  was  not  seeking  sovereignty  but  only 
the  exercise  of  sovereignty  over  the  Canal.  I would  like  to  ask  Dr.  Butler 
this  question:  If  we  went  into  the  World  Court  without  signing  the 
compulsory  arbitration  clause  and  the  Senate  consented  to  taking  issues  to 
the  World  Court  for  arbitration,  what  practical  difference  would  it  make 
to  us  as  to  whether  we  had  sovereignty  or  the  exercise  of  sovereignty? 

Dr.  Butler:  None  whatever. 

The  Chairman:  If  Mr.  Penfield  is  going  to  answer  it,  then  perhaps 
I ought  to  repeat,  for  the  radio  audience,  Mr.  Holt’s  question.  In  effect, 

21 


his  question  was:  What  difference  would  it  make  whether  a Court  de- 
clared us  to  have  sovereignty  or  the  exercise  of  sovereignty  over  the 
Panama  Canal  ? 

Dr.  Butler:  The  word  “practical”  was  ahead  of  the  word  “differ- 
ence.” 

The  Chairman:  Yes,  what  practical  difference  was  there?  Dr.  But- 
ler said  none.  Mr.  Penfield  is  now  speaking  on  that  point. 

Mr.  Penfield:  There  is  a great  deal  of  difference  in  the  answer  to 
the  question  of  Mr.  Holt,  if  I understand  it  correctly.  That  very  dif- 
ference has  been  and  is  now  a subject  of  diplomatic  negotiations  between 
the  Government  of  Panama  and  the  United  States.  It  involves  the  ques- 
tion of  the  right  of  the  United  States  Government  to  maintain  commis- 
saries in  the  Canal  Zone  for  the  purpose  of  selling  merchandise  to  such 
employees  who  are  engaged  in  the  operation,  maintenance  or  sanitation 
of  the  Canal.  It  also  involves  the  question  of  the  right  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Panama  to  tax  all  material  that  comes  in  to  those  commissaries 
that  is  not  properly  intended  for  employees  engaged  in  the  construction, 
operation  or  sanitation  of  the  Canal.  It  is  a most  vital  question  to  the 
economic  welfare  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  the  maintenance  of  these 
commissaries  and  the  continued  selling  of  their  goods  to  ships  passing 
through  the  Canal. 

It  is  true  that  when  this  address  was  delivered  by  the  delegate  of 
Panama,  it  had  some  reference  to  a conflict  between  the  Treaty  of  1926 
between  Panama  and  the  United  States,  containing  a defensive  clause  in 
case  of  war  in  the  nature  of  an  alliance,  and  the  duties  that  Panama  has 
to  the  League  of  Nations  under  the  Covenant.  But  the  point  that  I 
make  is  that  the  delegate  of  Panama  made  a gesture  before  the  League 
of  Nations  in  regard  to  the  arbitration  of  the  question  of  our  sovereignty 
over  the  rights  of  the  Canal.  I believe  that  that  is  only  an  indication  of 
what  we  might  expect  if  we  were  a party  to  the  League  of  Nations.  I 
am  a firm  believer  that  we  should  not  become  a party  to  the  League  of 
Nations. 

Mr.  Haldenstein  : I would  like  to  ask  Mr.  Penfield  this  question : 
If  the  position  that  the  United  States  has  taken  in  reference  to  Panama 
is  a valid  one,  what  possible  objection  is  there  to  the  submission  of  the 
question  of  validity  to  an  impartial  court? 

Mr.  Penfield  : My  answer  to  that  is  that  while  I do  not  know  whether 
what  I am  now  going  to  say  is  true  or  not,  if  the  revelations  of  the  news- 
papers of  the  last  two  weeks  to  the  effect  that  the  umpire  of  a certain 
tribunal  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  were  in- 
volved was  paid  a large  sum  of  money  on  the  side  before  the  rendition 
of  that  decision,  it  shakes  somewhat  my  confidence  in  submitting  to  judges 
of  foreign  countries,  which  countries  may  not  be  friendly  toward  us,  the 

22 


question  of  our  rights  to  the  Panama  Canal,  especially  as  we  have  had 
those  rights  for  a period  of  a quarter  of  a century. 

Mr.  Goldman  : In  reference  to  Dr.  Butler’s  reply  to  the  question  of 
the  young  lady,  I want  to  ask  Dr.  Butler  if  it  would  not  take  a shorter 
time  to  undergo  the  cumbersome  procedure  of  placing  the  war-making 
power  with  the  people  than  to  leave  it  for  the  Senate  to  act  favorably  on 
the  Capper  or  any  other  resolution? 

The  Chairman:  The  question  asked  Dr.  Butler  is  whether  in  the 
long  run  you  perhaps  could  not  more  quickly  take  the  war-making  power 
from  Congress  and  give  it  to  the  people,  presumably  under  a plebiscite, 
than  to  get  the  Capper  resolution  adopted. 

Dr.  Butler  : I have  more  faith  in  the  American  people  than  that  and 
I am  looking  for  a very  active  answer  to  that  question  within  the  next 
four  months.  The  gentleman  must  not  forget  that  this  is  the  psychologi- 
cal moment  for  public  opinion  to  get  something  done  because  in  about 
eleven  months  a number  of  gentlemen  wish  to  be  elected  to  public  office. 

Mr.  Long:  Will  Dr.  Butler  tell  us  what  to  do  to  help  the  Senators 
pass  the  resolution? 

Dr.  Butler:  There  are  at  the  present  time  sixty-three  Senators. 
There  will  be  added  on  Monday  a certain  number  more — how  many  we 
shall  not  know  until  Tuesday.  My  information  is  that  about  seventy-five 
members  of  the  Senate  would  vote  for  the  Capper  resolution  if  they 
could  get  it  out  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee  and  on  the  calendar. 

Mr.  Rods  : I heard  Mr.  Roosevelt  say  these  words,  “I  took  the  Canal 
and  I let  Congress  talk !”  I would  like  to  know  how  constructive  a 
foreign  policy  that  is  in  the  light  of  recent  events? 

Mr.  Penfleld:  My  answer  to  that  question  is  that  in  1922  or  1923 
we  made  a treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Colombia  whereby  we  agreed  to 
pay  it  $25,000,000  in  instalments  of  $5,000,000  per  year  in  return  for 
securing  the  rights  to  the  Canal. 


23 


/ 


’ } 


THE  RESEARCH  DEPARTMENT 

Of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association 

Raymond  Leslie  Buell,  Ph.  D.,  Director 

Formerly  Assistant  Professor  of  Government,  Harvard  University 

Information  Service 

Whether  the  question  of  the  hour  is  Russia,  Italy,  China  or  Nic- 
aragua, the  facts  can  be  found  accurately  and  impartially  presented 
in  the  fortnightly  reports  of  the  F,  P.  A.  Information  Service. 

Used  by  more  than  700  editors,  65  national  organizations,  400 
college  professors,  and  1,900  F.  P,  A.  members. 

Recent  Issues  Include: 

INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  AND  PLANS  FOR  AN 
AMERICAN  LOCARNO 

FOREIGN  DEBTS  AND  AMERICA’S  BALANCE  OF  TRADE 
THE  FRANCO-AMERICAN  TARIFF  DISPUTE 
PAN-AMERICANISM  AND  THE  PAN-AMERICAN 
CONFERENCES 

RECENT  JAPANESE  POLICY  IN  CHINA 

Special  Supplementary  Studies: 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  WAR  DEBTS 

AMERICA,  THE  WORLD’S  BANKER 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Subscription  Rates: 

F.  P.  A.  Members  ------  $3.00 

Non-Members  ------  $5.00 

(Membership  dues  $5.00  a year.) 

(Subscribers  receive  twenty-six  Reports  a year  together  with  the 
Special  Supplements.) 

Further  Information  on  Request 

Foreign  Policy  Association 

NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 

18  East  41st  Street  New  York  City 


